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As the Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC I) corps engineer brigade headquarters, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 411th Engineer Brigade (Theater Army), provided proactive, timely, relevant, and essential command and control...
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As the Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC I) corps engineer brigade headquarters, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 411th Engineer Brigade (Theater Army), provided proactive, timely, relevant, and essential command and control for more than 3,000 engi ...
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Bombing in Baghdad. You have probably heard that often in the past year or so and seen images of people digging through rubble with their bare hands to help those who are trapped in a building partially destroyed by a bomb. But af...
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Bombing in Baghdad. You have probably heard that often in the past year or so and seen images of people digging through rubble with their bare hands to help those who are trapped in a building partially destroyed by a bomb. But after the bombing of the Un ...
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In February 2004 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revised the terms of reference for its ongoing inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. The new issue areas included 'any intelligence activities relating to Iraq cond...
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In February 2004 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revised the terms of reference for its ongoing inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. The new issue areas included 'any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.' The Committee pursued this issue area in 2004, but subsequently the Committee's attention was placed on other aspects of the terms of reference.
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This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military and civilian casualties in the active missions Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS, Afghanistan) and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR, Iraq and Syria) and, as well as operati...
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This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military and civilian casualties in the active missions Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS, Afghanistan) and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR, Iraq and Syria) and, as well as operations that have ended, Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan). It also includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), and amputations. Some of these statistics are publicly available at the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) website and others have been obtained through DOD experts.
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This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military casualties in the active Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan), as well as operations that have ended: Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF...
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This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military casualties in the active Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan), as well as operations that have ended: Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq). This report includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), amputations, evacuations, and the demographics of casualties.
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The modern American approach to developing and implementing war strategy has not achieved coherence and unity of effort and has thus far proved insufficient in the wars of the 21st Century. The approach suffers from insufficient i...
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The modern American approach to developing and implementing war strategy has not achieved coherence and unity of effort and has thus far proved insufficient in the wars of the 21st Century. The approach suffers from insufficient interagency dialogue, excessive hierarchy, redundancy, complexity, and flawed practices. Such defects pervade grand and military strategy, and are most pronounced in the attempts to develop strategy for Afghanistan and Iraq. This multidimensional problem is compounded by the pervasive forces of the political-military-industrial complex, legislative incongruity, the mutating character of war, military transformation, and flaws in the War Powers Resolution. Why is America struggling to design effective war strategies. Should it change its approach. Can it change. If it can, in what ways should it change its approach to develop coherent war strategy to achieve unity of effort as it meets the demands of persistent conflict. This paper explores the manifold factors underpinning this issue extant in the current conflicts involving Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, now in their ninth and seventh years respectably. It contends that America can and should adjust its approach to war strategy, and concludes with proposals to do so.
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Mr. Chairman, Congressman Ryan, and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the invitation to appear before you today to discuss budgeting for operations in Iraq and the war on terrorism. My statement is based on the Congressional ...
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Mr. Chairman, Congressman Ryan, and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the invitation to appear before you today to discuss budgeting for operations in Iraq and the war on terrorism. My statement is based on the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) analyses of and research on that issue over the past few years. CBO has been asked, on a number of occasions, to determine how much has been spent and how much might be spent in the future for those activities. This testimony will briefly discuss appropriations and obligations to date for operations in Iraq and the war on terrorism. It will also offer an overview of budgeting and reporting issues.
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Both the Iraq War and the Global War on Terror have been the subjects of considerable legislative activity since the opening days of the 110th Congress. After the Iraq Study Group released its recommendations on December 6, 2006, ...
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Both the Iraq War and the Global War on Terror have been the subjects of considerable legislative activity since the opening days of the 110th Congress. After the Iraq Study Group released its recommendations on December 6, 2006, President Bush followed on January 10, 2007, with an announcement of a new strategy for the Iraq War. The President's plan proposed a surge of 28,500 U.S. troops to help improve security in Baghdad and counter Al Qaeda operatives in Anbar Province. After the President's announcement, a number of bills were introduced in the House and Senate that reflected congressional opposition to the 'surge' of U.S. forces and that offered alternative plans for changing the U.S. forces' mission in Iraq. This report consists of a series of tables that summarize the legislation concerning Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) considered to date during the 110th Congress, as well as a select group of amendments to H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (currently awaiting Senate action), that relate to either OIF or the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
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Although they worked together nominally, the central Al Qaeda network, as led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's terrorist group in Iraq held vastly different conceptions of jihad. The U....
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Although they worked together nominally, the central Al Qaeda network, as led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's terrorist group in Iraq held vastly different conceptions of jihad. The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq minimized the magnitude of that ideological clash, enabling Zarqawi's limited cooperation with Al Qaeda in the Iraqi arena. Although they used each other for tactical support, publicity, and recruiting purposes, their doctrinal differences made them only allies of convenience rather than genuine partners, and as Zarqawi's tactics grew more extreme and indiscriminate, Al Qaeda chose to distance itself from his handiwork. The U.S. air strike that killed Zarqawi on June 7, 2006, deprived Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) of its strategic leader. But the knowledge that U.S., Iraqi, and Jordanian intelligence effectively penetrated AQI to gather information on Zarqawi's whereabouts is just as important to the group's future as Zarqawi's elimination. The coalition ' demonstrated ability to gather accurate intelligence is likely to frighten and sow distrust among AQI's remaining members. This heightens the leadership challenge for AQI's new emir, identified only under the alias Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir. His response to the internal security questions and the lingering doctrinal impasse with Al Qaeda proper will determine the organization's future trajectory. The challenge for Muhajir is to strike a balance between appealing to secular and tribal Sunnis in Iraq, some of whom likely provided intelligence that helped doom Zarqawi, while maintaining an insular terrorist network that can sustain potentially weakening criticism from Islamic, Arab, and Western sources.
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